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Abstract
Recent work on optimal policy in sticky price models suggests that demand
management through fiscal policy adds little to optimal monetary policy. We explore
this consensus assignment in an economy subject to ‘deep’ habits at the level of
individual goods where the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result
in government spending crowding-in private consumption in the short run. We
explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination
in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal
monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional
externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple (but potentially non-
linear) policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy.
• JEL Codes: E21, E63, E61
• Keywords: Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Deep Habits, New Keynesian.
1 Introduction
Recent work looking at optimal monetary and fiscal policy in sticky-price New Keynesian
models (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003)) typically finds that fiscal policy should be largely devoted to ensuring fiscal
solvency, while monetary policy plays a demand management role.1 In the context of
a benchmark sticky wage and price New Keynesian economy, Eser, Leith, and Wren-
Lewis (2009) demonstrate analytically that the government spending gap should always
be zero even if nominal frictions imply that it is optimal for monetary policy to support
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of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RT, e-mail: c.b.leith@lbss.gla.ac.uk, i.moldovan@lbss.gla.ac.uk and
r.rossi.1@research.gla.ac.uk. We thank for comments the seminar participants at the CDMA confer-
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1For a discussion of this consensus assignment in the light of these and other papers, see Kirsanova,
Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2009).
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a non-zero output gap.2 In other words, provided there are no constraints on monetary
policy, demand management through changes in government spending relative to its
eﬃcient level contributes little or nothing to the stabilisation problem in a benchmark
New Keynesian economy. The current paper explores the robustness of this result in
the context of a New Keynesian model of monetary and fiscal policy where households
possess ‘deep habits’ as in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), where the habits
are formed at the level of individual goods rather than the households’ overall level of
consumption (‘superficial’ habits).
The introduction of deep habits to the benchmark New Keynesian model is impor-
tant in two key respects. Firstly, when habits exist at the level of individual goods it
implies that price setters face dynamic demand functions such that pricing decisions are
dynamic and mark-ups become countercyclical in line with the empirical evidence. The
counter-cyclicality of mark-up behaviour in turn implies that consumption and wages
can respond positively to positive government spending shocks, in contrast to models
without deep habits where government spending typically crowds out private consump-
tion. In other words, the fiscal policy transmission mechanism can be quite diﬀerent
from that when habits are either absent or superficial, and there are a number of em-
pirical studies which argue that such correlations are more consistent with the data -
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2008) review this empirical evidence and ar-
gue that deep habits are an eﬀective mechanism for capturing this feature of the data.3
Secondly, the habits externality, whereby households do not take account of the impact
of their consumption decisions on the welfare of others, implies that there is a signif-
icant additional distortion in the economy beyond those associated with monopolistic
competition and nominal inertia. As a result, there may be a potential role for fiscal
stabilisation policy alongside monetary policy in such an economy.
In order to explore the relative contribution of monetary and fiscal policy to macro-
economic and fiscal stabilisation, we construct a sticky-price New Keynesian economy
along the lines of Benigno and Woodford (2003), where households provide labour to
imperfectly competitive firms who are only able to change prices after a random interval
of time. As in Benigno and Woodford (2003), taxes are distortionary. We begin explor-
ing the fiscal policy transmission mechanism by varying the relative extent of habits in
private and public goods consumption and by allowing firms to discriminate between
pricing for private and public goods. In light of these results, we then assess the ability
of fiscal policy to stabilise an economy with price-stickiness, monopolistic competition
and deep habits in private and public consumption. In doing so, unlike Benigno and
Woodford (2003), we also allow government spending to be used as a policy instrument,
2Where, in the context of describing optimal policy, we define a gap as being the deviation of a
variable from its eﬃcient level, i.e. the level which would be chosen by a social planner unconstrained
by the decentralised equilibrium.
3Although Ramey (2008) argues such results are driven by the failure of VARs to correctly capture
the timing of fiscal shocks.
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rather than treating it as an exogenous stream which needs to be financed.
In the next section, we describe our model. Section 3 then examines the fiscal policy
transmission mechanism, before we explore optimal stabilisation policy. We find that
although government spending shocks can crowd in private sector consumption in the
short-run, such eﬀects really only emerge at high levels of deep habits formation and
common pricing across goods sold to the private and public sectors. When we turn
to augmenting optimal monetary policy with the government spending instrument, we
find that this instrument adds very little to stabilisation policy even in our sticky price
economy with a significant consumption externality.
Further enriching the policy problem to include government debt and consider dis-
tortionary taxation to be a policy instrument, we find that it remains optimal to allow
steady-state government debt to follow a random walk.4 At the same time monetary
policy essentially acts to stabilise the consumption gap in the face of technology shocks
and tax policy deals with the mark-up shocks and the consumption externality, without
generating inflation in either case.
In the final section, we examine the determinacy properties of simple monetary and
fiscal rules, before assessing the ability of such rules to mimic the fully-optimal Ramsey
policy. We find that the usual classification of the determinate active and passive policy
rules due to Leeper (1991) depends upon the extent of deep habits formation present.
Our analysis also shows that while optimised simple monetary policy rules imply little
role for linear terms in output, allowing the fiscal rules to respond to output AND
allowing either the monetary or fiscal rules to be non-linear, such that they respond
diﬀerently to booms and recessions, enables them to better mimic the Ramsey policy.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, two monopolistically competitive production
sectors, and the government. The households derive utility from the consumption of both
private and public goods. There is a continuum of final goods of each type, with each final
good being produced as an aggregate of a continuum of intermediate goods. Households
form external consumption habits at the level of the individual private/public final goods
in their baskets - Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) call this type of habits ‘deep’.
Furthermore, we assume price inertia at the level of intermediate goods producers.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure
1. Households derive utility from consumption of composite private and public goods
and disutility from hours spent working.
4As in, for example, Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), and Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2007).
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Deep Habits When habits are of the deep kind, each household’s private consumption
basket, Xkt , is an aggregate of a continuum of habit-adjusted final goods, indexed by i
and of measure 1,
Xkt =
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit − θCit−1
´ η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
,
where Ckit is household k’s consumption of good i and Cit ≡
R 1
0 C
k
itdk denotes the cross-
sectional average consumption of this good. η is the elasticity of substitution between
habit-adjusted final goods (η > 1), while the parameter θ measures the degree of external
habit formation in the consumption of each individual private good i. Setting θ to 0
returns us to the usual case of no habits in private consumption.
The composition of the consumption basket is chosen in order to minimize expendi-
tures, and the resultant demand for an individual final goods is
Ckit =
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η
Xkt + θCit−1, ∀i
where PCt represents the overall price index (or CPI), defined as an average of prices of
private final goods, PCt ≡
³R 1
0
¡
PCit
¢1−η di´1/(1−η). Aggregating across households yields
the total demand for good i, i ∈ [0, 1] ,
Cit =
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η
Xt + θCit−1. (1)
Due to the presence of habits, this demand is dynamic in nature, as it depends not
only on current period elements but also on the lagged value of consumption. This, in
turn, will make the pricing/output decisions of the firms producing these final goods,
intertemporal.
Remainder of the Household’s Problem For the remainder of the households’
problem, households choose the habit-adjusted private consumption aggregate, Xkt ,
hours worked, Nkt , and the portfolio allocation, Dkt+1, to maximize expected lifetime
utility,
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
"¡
Xkt
¢1−σ
1− σ − χ
¡
Nkt
¢1+υ
1 + υ
+ χG
¡
XGt
¢1−σ
1− σ
#
subject to the budget constraint,Z 1
0
PCit C
k
itdi+EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 = (1− τ t)WtNkt +Dkt +Φt (2)
and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t, β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) , χ the relative
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weight on disutility from time spent working, χG the relative weight on utility from con-
sumption of public goods, and σ and υ are the inverses of the intertemporal elasticities
of habit-adjusted consumption and work (σ, υ > 0; σ 6= 1). The household’s period-t
income includes: after-tax wage income from providing labour services to intermediate
goods producing firms (1− τ t)WtNkt , dividends from the monopolistically competitive
firms Φt, and payments on the portfolio of assets Dkt . Financial markets are complete
and Qt,t+1 is the one-period stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs. τ t is the labor
income tax rate. In the maximization problem, households take as given the processes
for Ct−1, Wt, Φt, and τ t, as well as the initial asset position Dk−1.
The first order conditions for labour and habit-adjusted consumption are:
χ
¡
Nkt
¢υ¡
Xkt
¢−σ = (1− τ t)wt
and
Qt,t+1 = β
Ã
Xkt+1
Xkt
!−σ
PCt
PCt+1
,
where wt ≡ WtPCt is the real wage (see Appendix A for further details). The Euler equation
for consumption can be written as
1 = βEt
"Ã
Xkt+1
Xkt
!−σ
PCt
PCt+1
#
Rt,
where R−1t = Et [Qt,t+1] denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate
between periods t and t+ 1.
2.2 The Government
Deep Habits While it is natural to think of households failing to internalise the
impact of their consumption decisions on the utility of others, it is less obvious that
government spending decisions are subject to a similar externality if spending is on
global public goods. However, if public goods are local then the externality in govern-
ment consumption can occur at a local level. Controversies over ‘post-code lotteries’ in
health care and other local services (Cummins, Francis, and Coﬀey (2007)) and com-
parisons of regional per capita government spending levels (MacKay (2001)) suggest
that households care about their local government spending levels relative to those in
other constituencies. We therefore allow for these eﬀects in public consumption, but
will assess how optimal policy varies as we alter the extent of such externalities. It is
important to note that, although the national government is aware of the externality
in the households’ perception of public goods provision, in allocating public spending
across goods, they are bound by the experience of that spending within each house-
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hold. In other words, this is not a model of pork-barrel politics where local politicians
over-provide local services which are financed from universal taxation5, but simply one
in which public goods are local in nature and households care about the provision of
individual public goods in their constituency relative to other constituencies.
Assuming, for simplicity, that each household defines an area associated with a local
public good, the government decides for each household on the provision of individual
public goods so as to maximize the aggregate XG,kt that enters household k’s utility
function, given the allocated level of aggregate spending, Git−1, from the previous period,
max
{Gkit}i
XG,kt =
µZ 1
0
³
Gkit − θGGit−1
´η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
s.t.
Z 1
0
PGit G
k
itdi ≤ PGt Gkt .
Since final goods producers could potentially discriminate between sales to the private
and the public sectors, we allow for a distinct set of public final goods prices,
©
PGit
ª
i, and
a corresponding price index, PGt . θ
G gives a measure of the level of habits formation
in the consumption of public goods. In the maximization problem, the government
takes as given the past consumption of individual public goods, as it respects the habits
formation behaviour of households. The demand for public goods i, i ∈ [0, 1] , by
household/constituency k is
Gkit =
µ
PGit
PGt
¶−η
XG,kt + θ
GGit−1,
where PGt is the average of public goods prices, PGt =
³R 1
0
¡
PGit
¢1−η di´ 11−η . Aggregating
across all households/constituencies obtains the overall demand for public goods i,
Git =
Z 1
0
Gkitdk =
µ
PGit
PGt
¶−η
XGt + θ
GGit−1,
which is also dynamic in nature.
Government Budget Constraint Combining the series of the representative
consumer’s flow budget constraints, (2), with borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi-
schemes, gives the intertemporal budget constraint (see Woodford (2003), chapter 2,
page 69),
∞X
T=t
Et[PTCT ] ≤ Dt +
∞X
T=t
Et[Qt,T (ΦT +WTNT (1− τT ))].
5For a model of pork-barrel politics with vote-trading and alternative voting mechanisms, see Chari
and Cole (1995).
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Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PCt Y
C
t + P
G
t Y
G
t =WtNt +ΦT ,
and the definition of aggregate demand, we can rewrite the private sector’s budget
constraint as,
Dt = −
∞X
T=t
Et[Qt,T (PGT GT −WTNT τT )]
which implies that some combination of monetary accommodation, distortionary taxa-
tion and spending adjustments is required to service government debt as well as stabilise
the economy.6 Noting that, in aggregate, the households’ net portfolio consists of gov-
ernment bonds Dt = Bt allows us to write the flow budget constraint as,
Bt+1 = Rt(Bt + PGt Gt −WtNtτ t) (3)
or in real terms,
bt+1 = Rt
∙
bt(πCt )
−1 +
PGt
PCt
Gt − wtNtτ t
¸
,
where bt = BtPCt−1
.
2.3 Firms
In this subsection we consider the behaviour of firms. These are split into two kinds:
final and intermediate goods producing firms, respectively. Final goods producers may
also diﬀerentiate their output/pricing decisions according to the which sector they are
supplying, private or public. Intermediate goods firms produce a diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate good and are subject to nominal inertia in the form of Calvo (1983) contracts.
This structure is adopted for reasons of tractability, allowing us to easily explore dif-
ferent degrees of price discrimination and habits across private and public consumption
goods in a sticky price environment. Additionally, combining optimal price setting un-
der both Calvo contracts and dynamic demand curves would undermine the desirable
aggregation properties of the Calvo model as each firm given the signal to re-set prices
would set a diﬀerent price dependent on the level of consumption habits their prod-
uct enjoyed relative to other firms’. By separating the two pricing decisions we avoid
reintroducing the history-dependence in price setting the Calvo set-up is designed to
avoid. In contrast, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2008) use the quadratic
adjustment cost model of Rotemberg (1982) to introduce nominal inertia to a model
with deep habits - while this allows them to introduce price stickiness at the level of
6 In sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, we temporarily abstract from the fiscal financing needs of the gov-
ernment by allowing access to lump-sum taxation. We do so in order to explore the implications of
removing government debt from the policy problem, before excluding lump-sum taxes and returning to
the more realistic case where all taxes are distortionary.
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final goods firms, it removes the price dispersion that is a major cost in our model with
Calvo (1983) contracts.7 This is not a concern in their analysis as they are interested in
the empirical properties of the deep habits model, rather than describing optimal policy
as we do.
2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
We assume that final goods (of either type) are produced by monopolistically competitive
firms as an aggregate of a set of intermediate goods (indexed by j), according to the
function
Yit =
µZ 1
0
(Yjit)
ε−1
ε dj
¶ ε
ε−1
, (4)
where ε is the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs in production (ε > 1)
and Yit represents the total amount of final goods produced (i.e. the sum of private and
public final goods, Yit = Y Cit + Y
G
it ).
Taking as given intermediate goods prices {Pjit}j and subject to the available tech-
nology (4), firms first choose the amount of intermediate inputs {Yjit}j that minimize
production costs
R 1
0 PjitYjitdj. The first order conditions yield the demand functions
Yjit =
µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
Yit, ∀j, ∀i, (5)
where Pmit ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−ε
jit dj
´ 1
1−ε is the aggregate of intermediate goods prices in sector i
and represents the nominal marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the final
good i.
Deep Habits The nominal profits from producing private goods are given as,
ΦCit ≡
¡
PCit − Pmit
¢
Y Cit ,
and those from producing public goods as,
ΦGit ≡
¡
PGit − Pmit
¢
Y Git ,
where we distinguish between the prices charged for public goods and private goods to
allow final goods producing firms to price discriminate between the two sectors. We also
consider what happens when such price discrimination is not possible.
When habits in both types of goods are of the deep kind, the respective demand
functions are dynamic in nature, which renders the firms’ profit maximization problem
intertemporal — in setting prices, firms take account of the subsequent eﬀects on market
7Lombardo and Vestin (2008) show that the welfare costs of Calvo (1983) contracts are typically
higher than under Rotemberg (1982) when the steady-state is ineﬃcient, as is the case in our model.
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share driven by habit formation. Firms choose processes for PZit and Y
Z
it (for Z =
C,G) to maximize the present discounted value of profits, Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+sΦZit+s, under the
restriction that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price, Zit = Y Zit . Formally, we
have:
max
{PZit , Y Zit }i
Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+sΦZit+s = Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+s
¡
PZit+s − Pmit+s
¢
Y Zit+s
s.t.Y Zit+s =
Ã
PZit+s
PZt+s
!−η
XZt+s + θ
ZY Zit+s−1
Qt,t+s = βs
µ
Xt+s
Xt
¶−σ PCt
PCt+s
, with Z = C,G
and the first order conditions are:
vit =
¡
PCit − Pmit
¢
+ θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]
vGit =
¡
PGit − Pmit
¢
+ θGEt
£
Qt,t+1vGit+1
¤
Y Cit = vit
"
η
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η−1 ¡
PCt
¢−1
Xt
#
and
Y Git = v
G
it
"
η
µ
PGit
PGt
¶−η−1 ¡
PGt
¢−1
XGt
#
where vit and vGit are the Lagrange multipliers on the dynamic demand constraints and
represent the shadow prices of producing private and public good i, respectively. These
shadow values equal the marginal benefit of additional profits from each type of good,
PCit − Pmit and PGit − Pmit , respectively, plus the discounted expected payoﬀs from higher
future sales, θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1] and θGEt
£
Qt,t+1vGit+1
¤
. In the presence of deep habits in
consumption increasing sales to the private (public) sector leads to an increase in sales
of θ (θG) in the next period. The other first order conditions indicate than an increase
in price PCit (P
G
it ) brings additional revenues of Y
C
it (Y
G
it ) while simultaneously causing
a decline in demand given by the terms in square brackets and valued at the respective
shadow prices.
In contrast, if we do not allow final goods producers to discriminate between private
and public purchases of their products then the first order conditions reduce to,
vit =
¡
PCit − Pmit
¢
+ θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]
vGit =
¡
PGit − Pmit
¢
+ θGEt
£
Qt,t+1vGit+1
¤
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and
Y Cit + Y
G
it = η
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η−1 ¡
PCt
¢−1 £
vitXt + vGitX
G
t
¤
with the additional constraint that PGit = P
C
it . The combined first order condition
indicates that the common price should be increased until the extra revenue generated
by selling to both sectors, Y Cit + Y
G
it , matches the value of the decline in demand.
2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods sectors consist of a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms indexed by j and of measure 1. Each firm j produces a unique good using only
labour as input in the production process
Yjit = AtNjit. (6)
Total factor productivity, At, aﬀects all firms symmetrically and follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + (At , with persistence parameter ρA ∈ (0, 1) and
random shocks (At ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2A
¢
.
Firms choose the amount of labour that minimizes production costs, WtNjit. The
minimization problem gives a demand for labour Njit =
Yjit
Ajit
and a nominal marginal
cost MCt = WtAt , which is the same across firms. Nominal profits are expressed as
Φjit ≡ (Pjit −MCt)Yjit.
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints
of Calvo (1983)-contracts such that, with fixed probability (1− α) in each period, a
firm can reset its price and with probability α the firm retains the price of the previous
period. When a firm can set the price, it does so in order to maximize the present
discounted value of profits, Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦjit+s, and subject to the demand for its own
good (5) and the constraint that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price. Profits are
discounted by the s-step ahead stochastic discount factor Qt,t+s and by the probability
of not being able to set prices in future periods.
Optimally, the relative price satisfies the following relationship:
P ∗jit
PCt
=
µ
ξt
ξt − 1
¶ Et ∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
³
Pt+s
Pt
´−1 ¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
where mct = MCtPCt
is the real marginal cost. Following Ireland (2004), we allow the
desired mark-up, ξtξt−1 , to be time varying by allowing for shocks to the mark-up
implied by the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, where ln (ξt) =
(1− ρm) ln(ε) + ρm ln(ξt−1) + (mt and (mt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a vari-
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ance of σ2m. Ireland (2004) finds, in the context of a benchmark New Keynesian model,
that mark-up shocks are more important than technology shocks in driving movements
in inflation and, for anything beyond relatively short time horizons, the output gap.
Furthermore, the mark-up shock is also used as a device to generate policy trade-oﬀs
between output gap and inflation stabilisation in the benchmark New Keynesian model,
where the nominal inertia costs of technology shocks can easily be avoided through an
appropriate monetary policy response. While our model with deep habits and fiscal
policy contains additional distortions, such that technology shocks also present policy
makers with trade-oﬀs, it is interesting to consider the impact of mark-up shocks on the
description of optimal policy.
Pmit represents the price at the level of sector i and is an average of intermediate
goods prices within that sector. With α of firms keeping last period’s price and (1− α)
of firms setting a new price, the law of motion of this price index is:
(Pmit )
1−ε = α
¡
Pmit−1
¢1−ε
+ (1− α)
¡
P ∗jit
¢1−ε .
This description of intermediate goods firms is the same irrespective of nature of final
goods pricing to consumers or the government.
2.4 Equilibrium
In the absence of sector-specific shocks or other forms of heterogeneity, final goods
producers are symmetric and so are households. However, symmetry does not apply
to intermediate goods producers who face randomness in price setting. There is a
distribution of intermediate goods prices and aggregate output is therefore determined
as (see Appendix B for details on aggregation)
Yt ≡ Y Ct + Y Gt = At
Nt
∆t
. (7)
∆t ≡
Z 1
0
³
Pjt
Pmt
´−ε
dj is the measure of price dispersion, which can be shown (see Wood-
ford (2003), Chapter 6) to follow an AR(1) process given by
∆t = (1− α)
µ
P ∗t
Pmt
¶−ε
+ α (πmt )
ε∆t−1. (8)
Note that we have three measures of aggregate prices, a producer price index Pmt ,
the usual consumer price index PCt , and the index of the prices of goods supplied to the
government PGt , and consequently, there will be three measures of inflation. We define:
πmt ≡
Pmt
Pmt−1
, πGt ≡
PGt
PGt−1
and πCt ≡
PCt
PCt−1
. Furthermore, the three inflation variables are
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related according to the following relationship
πmt = π
C
t
μCt−1
μCt
= πGt
μGt−1
μGt
, (9)
where μCt ≡
PCt
Pmt
and μGt ≡
PGt
Pmt
are the markups of final private and public goods produc-
ers, respectively. In the presence of deep habits, these markups are time-varying. The
overall markup in the economy is given by the product of markups in the intermediate
goods and final goods sectors.
Finally, the aggregate version of the household’s budget constraint (2) combines
with the government budget constraint (3) and the definition of aggregate profits (Φt =
PCt Y Ct + PGt Y Gt −WtNt) to obtain the usual aggregate resource constraint,
PCt Y
C
t + P
G
t Y
G
t = P
C
t Ct + P
G
t Gt. (10)
The equilibrium is then characterized by equations (7) - (10), together with the
government budget constraint and the equilibrium conditions defining the households’
and the firms’ behaviour (Appendix B lists the entire set of equilibrium conditions), to
which we add the monetary and fiscal policy specification (as detailed in Sections 3 and
4 below).
2.5 Solution Method and Model Calibration
Since we are ultimately interested in assessing the welfare benefits of allowing fiscal
policy to contribute to the stabilisation of our New Keynesian economy featuring deep
habits, we cannot rely on linear approximations to our model’s equilibrium conditions
when evaluating optimal policy. Kim and Kim (2003) have shown that such approxima-
tions can give rise to spurious welfare rankings amongst alternative policies. Instead, we
employ the perturbation methods of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) to obtain a sec-
ond order accurate solution to the model which can be used to validly rank the welfare
consequences of alternative policies. Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse (2008) show, in the
context of a New Keynesian model subject to superficial habits of a magnitude similar to
the deep habits we consider here, that attempting to compute optimal monetary policy
using a linearised model can introduce significant errors relative to the case where the
optimal policy is based on a second-order accurate solution to the model.
In order to solve the model, we must select numerical values for some key structural
parameters. Table 1 reports our choices, which are similar to those of other studies
using a New Keynesian economy with habits in consumption. The model is calibrated
to a quarterly frequency and we assume an annual real rate of interest of 4%, which
implies a discount factor β of 0.9902. The risk aversion parameter σ is set at 2.0, while
υ equals 0.258, and the relative weight on labour in the utility function χ is assumed
8υ is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity. While estimates of this elasticity vary quite
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to be 3.0, while χG is 0.111. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the level of price
inertia α is 0.75 and we set η = ε = 11 which implies a degree of market power of 1.21,
split approximately equally between the two monopolistically competitive sectors of our
economy. For the habits formation parameters θ and θG, we use a benchmark value
of 0.65, which falls within the range of estimates identified in the literature9, but we
allow for diﬀerent possible values in the [0, 1) interval as we conduct sensitivity analyses
of our results. We further assume a steady state government debt to GDP ratio that
corresponds to an annual average of 60%. Under the Ramsey optimal policy, the implicit
steady state tax rate takes an empirically plausible value of 0.35 under no habits and 0.31
under the benchmark calibration of habits, reflecting primarily the fiscal financing role of
taxes.10 Technology shocks are assumed persistent with persistence parameter ρA = 0.9
and standard deviation σA = 0.009, while the mark-up shocks in the intermediate goods
sector follow the estimated process in Ireland (2004), ρm = 0.9625 and σm = 0.0012. In
the case of an exogenous government spending process, its characteristics are given by
ρG = 0.9 and σG = 0.014.
3 Optimal Ramsey Policy
In this section, we consider the nature of optimal policy in response to exogenous shocks.
The optimal policy problem can be set up in terms of a Lagrangian as,
L0 = max
yt
E0
∞X
t=0
βt[U(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut)− λtf(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut)]
where yt and ut are vectors of the model’s endogenous and exogenous variables, respec-
tively, U(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) =
(Xt)1−σ
1−σ − χ
(Nt)1+υ
1+υ + χ
G (X
G
t )
1−σ
1−σ , f(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) = 0
are the model’s equilibrium conditions (equations (19) - (39) in Appendix B), and λt is
a vector of lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints.
The optimisation implies the following first order conditions,
Et
∙
∂U(.)
∂yt
+ βF
∂U(.)
∂yt−1
+ β−1λt−1F−1
∂f(.)
∂yt+1
+ λtF−1
∂f(.)
∂yt
+ βλt−1F
∂f(.)
∂yt−1
¸
= 0
(11)
where F is the lead operator, such that F−1 is a one-period lag. A second-order accurate
widely, we follow the macroeconomic literature in using a larger value, similarly to Gali, Lopez-Salido,
and Valles (2007).
9Macro-based estimates of habits formation of the superficial type range from 0.59 as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) to very high values of 0.98 as reported by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005).
For the deep type of habits, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) give a value of 0.86. Micro-based
estimates (see, for example, Ravina (2007)) are substantially lower, with a range of 0.29-0.5.
10 In the case where the government has access to lump-sum taxes to balance the budget, the optimal
steady state tax rate would be −0.21 with no habits, reflecting the long-run ineﬃciency due to monopo-
listic competition, and a very large 0.57 under the benchmark value of habits, reflecting the consumption
externality.
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solution to optimal policy then involves solving these first order conditions in combina-
tion with the non-linear equilibrium conditions of the model, f(ys+1,ys,ys−1,us) = 0,
using the perturbation methods of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
We measure the welfare cost of a particular policy as the fraction of permanent con-
sumption that must be given up in order to equal welfare in the stochastic economy to
that of the steady state, E0
∞P
t=0
βtu
¡
Xt, Nt,XGt
¢
= (1− β)−1 u
³
(1− θ) (1− ζ)C,N,XG
´
.
Given the utility function adopted, the expression for ζ in percentage terms is
ζ =
"
1− [(1− σ)Θ]
1
1−σ
(1− θ)C
#
× 100,
where Θ ≡ (1− β)W + χN
1+υ
1+υ − χG

XG
1−σ
1−σ and W ≡ E0
∞P
t=0
βtu
¡
Xt, Nt,XGt
¢
repre-
sents the expectation of lifetime utility in the stochastic equilibrium, conditional on the
economy being in the Ramsey non-stochastic steady state in the first period.11
In order to explore the contribution of fiscal policy instruments to optimal stabil-
isation in a sticky price economy featuring deep habits, we gradually introduce fiscal
considerations to the policy problem. To begin with, we consider the nature of the fiscal
policy transmission mechanism by introducing exogenous government spending shocks
to a model variant where monetary policy is optimal. This allows us to explore the
crowding-in results of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) in an economy where
monetary policy is conducted optimally and where we can make diﬀerent assumptions
about the pricing of private and public goods. We then allow government spending to
be varied as part of optimal policy, to assess whether or not government spending (as
a proxy for the manipulation of aggregate demand through fiscal policy) contributes to
stabilisation policy. In both cases, we temporarily abstract from fiscal solvency issues
by assuming the policy maker has access to a lump-sum tax through which to balance
the budget. We then relax this assumption and consider the optimal policy response
to technology and cost-push shocks, when taxes are distortionary and Ricardian equiv-
alence no longer holds. In all cases, we consider optimal policies with commitment.
Finally, in Section 4 we explore the ability of potentially non-linear, but simple policy
rules to replicate the Ramsey policy.
3.1 Exogenous Government Spending and Optimal Monetary Policy
We first consider the case when fiscal policy is exogenous, while monetary policy is
set optimally under commitment, and the government has access to lump-sum taxes
to balance its budget. We assume that government spending follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnGt = (1− ρG) lnG+ ρG lnGt−1 + (Gt , with persistence parameter
11We opt for a conditional measure of welfare because the random walk properties of Ramsey policy,
that emerge in the presence of government debt (see Section 3.3), do not allow for the computation of
an unconditional welfare measure.
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ρG ∈ (0, 1) and random shocks (Gt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2G
¢
. Even though government spending is
exogenous, households still derive utility from the consumption of public goods and form
habits accordingly. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate to maximize
households’ welfare subject to the private sector’s response and given the exogenous
processes. We analyze the implications of this policy in terms of impulse responses to a
government spending shock.
A Positive Government Spending Shock Figure 1 details the impulse re-
sponses to a positive government spending shock in three cases - no habits, habits
of θ = θG = 0.65 and common pricing across private and public goods and, finally, the
same degree of habits, but with price discrimination across public and private goods.
Consider the case without habits: the increase in government spending results in an
increase in aggregate demand which the monetary authority oﬀsets by raising real in-
terest rates and discouraging household consumption. The policy maker does this until
consumption falls so much that labour supply increases more than labour demand and
the marginal costs of production actually fall.
We then consider the case where household preferences include deep habits over
both private and public goods (θ = θG = 0.65) and where the suppliers of these goods
are constrained to supply to the private and public sectors at the same price. Here,
the increased demand for goods tempts final goods suppliers to reduce their mark-ups
in order to capture a larger share of the increased overall product demand. Ceteris
paribus, this will tend to stimulate consumption. The policy maker encourages such
behaviour in the initial period by cutting the real interest rate and further encouraging
final goods suppliers to cut mark-ups and increase household consumption. This is
suﬃcient to actually result in the increase in government spending crowding in private
consumption. The reason why the policy maker behaves in this way is that the interest
rate cut boosts initial consumption which then supports subsequent consumption due
to the habits eﬀect. This is desirable as it then allows the policy maker to toughen
subsequent policy without inducing significant deflation through falling marginal costs.
Finally, we consider a variant with the same degree of habits but where the final
goods producers can charge diﬀerent prices to the private and public sectors. Here the
markup charged to the public sector is substantially reduced, but this does not aﬀect
other variables as the government’s activities are financed by lump-sum taxation in these
impulse responses. Accordingly, the government spending shock does not have a direct
impact on the markup charged to the private sector’s consumption. This means that
there is no attempt by final goods suppliers to cut their mark-up and encourage private
sector consumption. As a result, despite the initial cut in the real interest rate, there is
no crowding in of private sector consumption.
The crowding-in eﬀects are eﬀectively the result of the common pricing behaviour
by final goods producers combined with suﬃcient degrees of habits formation in either
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private, or private and public goods consumption. The crowding-in eﬀects disappear if,
for example, private goods consumption habits are at their benchmark level, θ = 0.65,
but habits in public goods consumption are smaller, for example θG = 0.2. However,
as the markup eﬀects on private consumption are important in generating these results,
higher degrees of habits formation in private consumption can restore the crowding-
in eﬀects (the dash-dot impulse responses in Figure 2 show a crowding in eﬀect when
θ = 0.85, even in the absence of habits in public goods consumption, θG = 0). It should
be noted, however, that these eﬀects are quantitatively small.
3.2 Endogenous Government Spending and Optimal Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we analyse the optimal policy response to technology and mark-
up shocks, where the nominal interest rate and government spending serve as policy
instruments. We continue to ignore the budgetary consequences of policy by assuming
fiscal authorities have access to a lump-sum tax with which to balance the budget.
A Technology Shock Figure 3 analyses the response to a positive technology
shock and includes three cases - no habits eﬀects and the case of deep habits with either
common or discriminatory pricing across private and public goods. In the absence
of habits eﬀects, policy seeks to eliminate the inflationary consequences of the shock,
leaving consumption, government spending and output suboptimally low due to the
distortionary eﬀects of monopolistic competition. If the policy maker were forced to
behave in a time consistent manner, then this permanent distortion would result in an
inflationary bias, but under commitment the policy maker is able to resist the temptation
to introduce policy surprises in order to oﬀset this distortion.
When we introduce significant deep habits eﬀects, the nature of the distortion
changes as households now over-consume, due to the habits externality, thus imply-
ing a significant consumption and output gap (the diﬀerence between actual output and
the eﬃcient level of output, as a percentage of the eﬃcient level12) of almost 30%. In
the face of this enormous externality, monetary policy no longer seeks to solely sta-
bilise inflation. Real interest rates are slowly relaxed, and consumption and output
rise. The rates are not cut as aggressively as in the absence of deep habits, as the
markup would fall further encouraging more undesirable consumption, and the policy
maker is prepared to suﬀer an initial fall in inflation. In fact, monetary policy may
even be tightened initially, when habits formation eﬀects are substantial, as is the case
under the benchmark calibration. The government spending gap is very small relative to
the massive consumption/output gaps, mirroring the findings in Eser, Leith, and Wren-
Lewis (2009) who demonstrate, in the benchmark New Keynesian model without habits,
that government spending contributed little to macroeconomic stabilisation. Given the
12See Appendix C for the details of the social planner’s problem.
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size of the consumption externality in this model with habits, it is diﬃcult to think of
circumstances where aggregate demand management through fiscal policy is likely to
contribute significantly to macroeconomic stabilisation unless use of monetary policy is
constrained, for example due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates or due
to participation in a monetary union.
A Mark-Up Shock We then consider the response of policy to a markup shock,
taken as a 1% increase in ξt, which represents a decrease in the intermediate goods
producers’ desired markup. In this case, the policy maker faces a trade-oﬀ between
inflation and output stabilization even in the absence of habits as inflation falls while
output rises. With little change in government spending, interest rates are initially raised
in order to reduce aggregate demand and the size of the output gap, while allowing for
additional deflation. This is illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 4.
In the presence of deep habits, the initial tightening of monetary policy is even
stronger, as the policy maker attempts to curb the large output gap that can ensue due
to over-consumption eﬀects. The increase in real interest rates discourages consumption
but also makes final goods producers raise markups, as they discount the lost future
profits that such price increases entail more strongly. This increase in markups further
subdues consumption, while at the same time being suﬃciently strong to make inflation
increase in equilibrium. The subsequent relaxation of policy reduces markups and hence
inflation but at the cost of increased consumption and output gaps. At the same time,
the government spending gap remains small relative to the consumption and output
gaps. While the ability to price discriminate across private and public goods does not
have much bearing on the results13, the time-varying markups that arise under deep
habits are shown to play an important role in the optimal policy response to cost-push
shocks.
3.3 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now turn to the analysis of optimal Ramsey policy when policy makers have control
over monetary policy and both fiscal policy instruments - government spending and
income taxes, but where they no longer have access to lump-sum taxes to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint. It is important to note that, if we did continue to
remove the need to adjust either government spending or distortionary taxes to satisfy
the intertemporal budget constraint, then the policy maker can achieve the first best
allocation using the income tax instrument to oﬀset the consumption externality and
the mark-up shocks, while using the interest rate to oﬀset the nominal inertia costs of
technology shocks.
Before considering the response to technology and mark-up shocks, it is interesting
to consider the initial steady-state of the Ramsey policy. This is computed by solving
13 Impulse responses across the two types of pricing behaviour are virtually the same.
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the steady-state of the Ramsey first order conditions and the equilibrium conditions
describing our New Keynesian economy, conditional on an initial government debt to
GDP ratio. In the case of our model without habits, the combination of the monopolistic
competition and tax distortions suppresses output below its socially eﬃcient level. In-
terestingly, the optimal policy implies that the absolute size of the government spending
gap is significantly smaller than the consumption gap. The intuition for this pattern lies
in the desire to support the debt stock with the optimal combination of gap variables
without generating any steady-state inflation. In the case of habits, the consumption
externality renders the level of output too high despite the presence of monopolistic
competition and distortionary taxation. As a result the consumption and government
spending gaps are positive, but the consumption gap is twice the size of the government
spending gap.
We now turn to consider the case where the policy maker utilises monetary and
fiscal instruments to stabilise both the economy and the government’s finances in the
face of technology and cost-push shocks, in an environment where the policy maker
faces multiple trade-oﬀs. Figure 5 details the response to a 1% positive technology
shock. A key element of the policy response is that the steady-state of government
debt follows a random walk as in Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004a), and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007). The basic intuition for this is that in
a sticky-price environment adjusting fiscal instruments to oﬀset fiscal shocks is costly,
such that policy makers ensure that policy instruments are adjusted to service the new
steady-state debt that emerges following shocks, but the policy maker commits to not
attempting to do more. In the absence of habits, gap variables are adjusted to their
new steady-state values from the second period onwards, and debt slowly evolves to its
new steady-state consistent with those variables. Real interest rates are adjusted in the
face of the technology shock to maintain consumption at its new constant gap value.
With a positive technology shock, tax rates fall and government spending, consumption
and output rise to support the lower steady-state debt stock without aﬀecting inflation.
As shown in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007), behaviour in the initial period is slightly
diﬀerent as the policy maker exploits the fact that expectations are given to reduce the
impact of the shock on debt. Accordingly, in the initial period real interest rates rise (to
raise debt service costs and oﬀset the increase in the tax base) and encourage a surprise
deflation in the initial period (although taxes rise to partially oﬀset this deflation) - the
combined impact of this is to reduce the eventual decline in debt that would otherwise
emerge.14
When there are deep habits in consumption, the policy maker needs to minimise both
the consumption externality and the costs of nominal inertia. Despite this additional
14Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) show that the combination of instruments used in the initial period
depends crucially upon the degree of price stickiness and the steady state debt-GDP ratio. In our
benchmark calibration, debt service costs and inflationary suprises are particularly eﬀective in influencing
the level of government debt.
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trade-oﬀ, the assignment of instruments remains similar, although the stabilisation of
gap variables at their new long-run levels is no longer immediately after the initial period
(it should be noted that the transition to the new steady-state still retains the property
that producer price inflation is eﬀectively zero). Monetary policy adjusts interest rates
to help stabilise the consumption gap in the face of the technology shock, and tax rates
are adjusted to largely oﬀset the extra consumption generated by the technology shock
in the presence of habits, while together ensuring that producer price inflation is near
zero from the second period onwards. Once again, in the initial period instruments are
used to reduce the long-run impact of the technology shock on government debt, most
noticeably through the increase in real interest rates, which has the added advantage of
reducing the initial boost to consumption. There are negligible diﬀerences when final
goods producers can price discriminate between private and public goods.
We now consider the mark-up shock detailed in Figure 6. In the absence of habits,
the tax rate is employed to mitigate the impact of the mark-up shock while maintaining
the consumption, government spending and output gaps close to their new steady-state
values. In the initial period, there is an attempt to oﬀset the long-run reduction in
government debt following the negative mark-up shock, primarily through tightening
monetary policy (which increases debt service costs, reduces the size of the tax base and
supports a surprise deflation). When we introduce deep habits, the policy maker has
to consider both the consumption externality and the mark-up shock. As a result, the
tax rate is raised more aggressively than in the absence of habits and producer price
inflation rises rather than falls. Nevertheless, gap variables are very quickly driven to
their new steady-state values which support the new steady-state value of debt without
generating inflation.
We note that an economy where final goods producers can price discriminate between
private and public consumption is very similar to the one in which they are constrained
to a common price policy. The responses to technology and mark-up shocks under
optimal Ramsey policies are almost identical across the two types of pricing behaviour.
4 Optimal Simple Rules
In this section we consider the ability of simple monetary and fiscal rules to achieve the
welfare outcomes commensurate with the fully optimal Ramsey policy. In addition to
analysing simple log-linear rules, our second order approximation of a heavily distorted
economy may also support the use of non-linear rules.
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Our general interest rate rule is given as,
ln(Rt/R) =
³
φR − (2φR2)1/2
´
ln(Rt−1/R) + (Rt−1/R)(2φR2 )
1/2
+
³
φπ − (2φπ2)1/2
´
ln(πmt /π
m) + (πmt /π
m)(2φπ2)
1/2
+
³
φy − (2φy2)1/2
´
ln(Yt/Y ) + (Yt/Y )
(2φy2 )
1/2
− 3,
with the following second order approximation,
bRt = φR bRt−1 + φR2 bR2t−1 + φπbπmt + φπ2 (bπmt )2 + φy bYt + φy2 bY 2t . (12)
The second order terms allow us to capture non-linearities in the otherwise log-linear
rules. For example, a positive coeﬃcient on the second order term implies that the
response to positive deviations of that variable from steady-state is higher than negative
deviations. Conversely, when the coeﬃcients are negative there are bigger responses
to negative deviations from the steady-state of the particular variable. Note that we
consider the adjustment of interest rates to changes in producer price inflation πmt (rather
than a more general inflation measure), as this is the inflation measure that captures
the costs of nominal inertia.15 The log-linear special case of this rule is similar to the
monetary policy rules considered in, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), while the second order terms allow us to capture
the asymmetric interest rate smoothing considered by Florio (2006) and the general
asymmetric behaviour either driven by non-linearities in the model (Dolado, Maria-
Dolores, and Naveira (2005)) or policy maker preferences (Srinivasan, Mahambare, and
Ramachandran (2006)).
We also consider similar rules for fiscal policy. Firstly describing the tax rate,
ln(τ t/τ) =
³
γb − (2γb2)1/2
´
ln(bt/b) + (bt/b)(2γb2 )
1/2
+
³
γy − (2γy2)1/2
´
ln(Yt/Y ) + (Yt/Y )
(2γy2 )
1/2
− 2
for which the second order approximation is given by,
bτ t = γbbbt + γb2bb2t + γy bYt + γy2 bY 2t (13)
and a similarly constructed rule for government spending, which in approximated form
is given by, bGt = κbbbt + κb2bb2t + κy bYt + κy2 bY 2t . (14)
The log-linear special cases of these fiscal rules are similar to those considered in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004a), Linnemann (2006), and Leith and von Thadden (2008) for
15See Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) for a discussion of the importance of targeting the
rate of inflation which captures the costs of the price dispersion associated with nominal inertia.
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the tax rule, and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) for the government spending rule.
4.1 Determinacy Analysis
While we are considering potentially non-linear policy rules in our second order accu-
rate model solution, the determinacy properties of those rules in the neighbourhood of
the steady-state can be assessed by considering a log-linearised description of our econ-
omy. Therefore we embed our policy rules in a log-linearised version of our equilibrium
conditions described in Appendix D.
Here, the benchmark results in the literature stem from Leeper (1991) who provides
the original characterisation of policy rules as being ‘active’ or ‘passive’. An active mon-
etary policy rule is one in which the monetary authority satisfies the Taylor principle
in that they adjust nominal interest rates such that real interest rates rise in response
to excess inflation. Conversely, a passive monetary rule is one which fails to satisfy this
principle. In Leeper (1991)’s terminology a passive fiscal policy is one in which the fiscal
instrument is adjusted to stabilise the government’s debt stock, while an active fiscal
policy fails to do this. Leeper (1991) demonstrated, in the context of a lump sum tax
instrument, that it is only active/passive policy combinations that ensure determinacy
of the rational expectations equilibrium. A similar characterisation16 emerges in the
context of economies where Ricardian equivalence does not hold and the policy instru-
ment is government spending (Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)) or distortionary taxation
(Linnemann (2006)). We now revisit these results in our New Keynesian economy with
deep habits. Since earlier results in this literature either do not consider feedback from
output to the policy instrument or find that such feedback does not significantly im-
prove welfare in an optimal simple rule (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a)), we set
φy = γy = κy = 0 to exclude output from the policy rules when considering determinacy.
Accordingly, our simple rules reduce to,
bRt = φR bRt−1 + φπbπmt (15)bτ t = γbbbt (16)bGt = κbbbt. (17)
In Figure 7 we plot the combinations of the fiscal feedback to government spending,
κb, and the monetary response to inflation, απ, for various degrees of interest rate
inertia, αR, and deep habits, θ = θG, assuming that final goods producing firms charge
the same price to both the private and public sectors. Moving across each row increases
the extent of deep habits, while moving down each column increases the extent of interest
16However, the presence of non-Ricardian elements can aﬀect the critical value of fiscal response
required to render the fiscal policy rule ‘passive’ (see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)) and, in models with
a richer supply side, can lead to bifurcations in the policy combinations required for determinacy, as in
Leith and von Thadden (2008).
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rate inertia. The picture in the top left corner therefore mimics the analysis of Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2000). If the monetary policy is active, απ > 1, then fiscal policy must
cut government spending in response to increased government debt. If fiscal policy fails
to respond to deviations of debt from steady-state, then the active monetary policy
will give rise to a debt interest spiral which implies instability. Meanwhile if monetary
policy is passive then this can help stabilise debt when fiscal policy fails to do so, as the
saddlepath solution delivers a path for real interest rates which oﬀsets the instability
in debt which would otherwise emerge. Finally, if fiscal policy is acting to stabilise
debt, then a passive monetary policy will lead to indeterminacy in the usual manner
as inflationary expectations become self-fulfilling (see Woodford (2003)). Moving down
the first column where we increase the degree of nominal interest rate inertia, then the
critical value for the interest rate response to inflation necessary for monetary policy to
be described as active falls below one. This is because it is the long-run response to
inflation, απ1−αR > 1, which is key to defining the Taylor principle in an inertial rule.
As we move across the columns, the determinacy region in the South-East quadrant
associated with a combination of an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy
is reduced for large fiscal responses to debt, rendering that part of the policy space
unstable. The intuition for this change is as follows: imagine a shock which raises the
debt stock. Government spending is reduced which implies that the final goods firms
will seek to increase their mark-ups. If the degree of habits is suﬃciently large, the
increasing mark-ups will raise consumer prices, labour costs, and inflation, resulting in
higher real interest rates which will destabilise the debt stock. Similarly, the previously
indeterminate combination of a passive monetary policy combined with a passive fiscal
policy which adjusts spending in response to deviations of debt from steady-state be-
comes increasingly determinate as the extent of deep habits is increased. Intuitively,
a shock which raises debt implies that government spending falls, mark-ups increase,
raising prices and, with a passive monetary policy, resulting in falls in real interest rates
which stabilise the debt.
In Figure 8 we perform the same analysis in a model variant where final goods firms
can price discriminate between the private and public sector. As a result the fiscal
rule does not directly aﬀect the mark-up charged on final goods for the private sector.
Accordingly, the presence of deep habits does not matter until the degree of deep habits
becomes very high.
In Figure 9 we consider the case of fiscal feedback to the tax rate rather than gov-
ernment spending in an economy where final goods firms charge the same price to the
private and public sectors. As before, for an economy without habits we find that an
active/passive policy combination is necessary to ensure determinacy, although for a
strong fiscal response to debt disequilibrium the response of interest rates to inflation
needs to be higher - this is because raising tax rates fuels inflation through their impact
on marginal costs. Interestingly, an active monetary policy combined with a fiscal policy
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which fails to raise taxes in response to higher debt is not always unstable, but can be
indeterminate if the inappropriate fiscal response is suﬃciently aggressive, due to the
supply side eﬀects of variations in tax rates. As the degree of habits is increased this
does not aﬀect this analysis until the extent of habits passes a critical value (see Figure
10). At this point almost all regions become indeterminate - for example, for the usual
active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy combination, the higher interest rates
in response to inflation, imply that the profits from investing in habits are lower so that
mark-ups increase, validating the increase in inflation.
In Figure 11 the determinacy properties of the tax rule is considered in an economy
where final goods firms can price discriminate between the private and public sectors
- the analysis is largely unchanged relative to Figure 9, although the bifurcation in
determinacy regions occurs earlier than under common pricing - see Figure 12.
4.2 Optimal Simple Rules
We search across the rule parameter space using the Simplex method employed by the
Fminsearch algorithm in Matlab (see, Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998)) in
order to minimise the conditional welfare losses associated with the rule. In searching,
we explored both the active monetary/passive fiscal and passive monetary/active fiscal
policy determinate regions of the policy space. Table 2 details the optimal parameters
for the simple linear rules in (15) - (17). Interestingly, the combination of a passive mon-
etary rule and an active government spending rule is preferable to the active monetary
rule/passive fiscal rule combination, although the costs of employing such simple rules
is significant with welfare costs that are at least 39% higher than fully optimal policy.
However, this simply reflects the fact that government spending does not contribute to
stabilisation. When we consider the combination of interest rate and tax rate rules there
is a significant improvement in welfare - the costs of following this pair of simple rules
amounts to 15.8% of welfare costs under Ramsey. Combining government spending and
tax rules marginally improves welfare further.
We then consider a richer set of rules which introduce non-linearities to monetary
policy and terms in output to the interest rate, government spending and tax rules.
As the results are very similar across the two forms of pricing, we concentrate on the
assumption of common pricing when exploring the non-linear refinement to the rules.
The optimal parameterisation of these rules is given by,
bRt = 1.2309 bRt−1 − 0.47092 bR2t−1 + 2.849bπmt + 3.7092 (bπmt )2 + 0.035696bYt − 2.9665bY 2t
bτ t = 0.18386bbt + 1.2049bYtbGt = 0.020784bbt + 1.0953bYt.
This combination of rules enables us to mimic the welfare levels attained by the Ramsey
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optimal policy, with the welfare costs under the optimal rule, ζ, only 0.23% higher
than under the Ramsey policy. The optimised rule coeﬃcients imply that government
spending is not being used to stabilise debt, but that government spending is moving
with output in order to ensure a stable government spending gap. The fiscal adjustment
is taking place through the tax rule, which also raises the tax rate in response to higher
output as a means of oﬀ-setting the consumption habits externality.17 The latter result
reflects the findings of Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) who show, in the context of a real
economy with superficial habits, that contractionary tax rates can help align output
with the eﬃcient level in response to technology shocks. The monetary policy rule in
its linear terms is fairly standard, implying that the rule is super inertial, with a strong
response to inflation and a relatively muted response to output. The non-linear terms
imply that interest rate inertia is more muted when interest rates are cut and interest
rates respond more to higher, than lower, inflation, but react more aggressively to falls,
than rises, in output. The latter may be thought to be surprising since the consumption
externality implies that output is suboptimally high such that booms are more likely to
concern the policy maker than recessions. However, the large coeﬃcient on output in
the tax rule implies that the tax rule is more than compensating for the consumption
externality.
We further assess the relative importance of adding output to the rules rather than
allowing policy to behave asymmetrically over the business cycle. We set the coeﬃcients
on quadratic terms to zero and obtain the following optimal parameterisation,
bRt = 1.0984 bRt−1 + 3bπmt + 0.012589bYt
bτ t = 0.12961bbt + 0.07563bYtbGt = 0.017091bbt + 0.957bYt.
Here we find that, although the rules come close to the Ramsey policy, they are not
fully able to mimic it, with a welfare cost of 0.0289% of permanent consumption which
is 2.04% higher than under the Ramsey policy. The key diﬀerence is that the absence
of the asymmetric monetary policy response does not enable the tax rule to fully deal
with the consumption habits externality and the optimised coeﬃcient on output in the
tax rule is significantly lower, falling from 1.2 to 0.076.
Finally we consider introducing the non-linearity to the fiscal rules rather than the
monetary rule. We find the optimised rules are given by,
bRt = 1.0959 bRt−1 + 2.9011bπmt + 0.010749bYt
bτ t = 0.14379bbt − 0.015854bb2t + 1.1088bYt − 0.056154bY 2t
17Since this rule is defined in terms of the tax rate, the response of the tax rate to output implies an
implicit stabilisation benefit to progressive taxation.
24
bGt = 0.010151bbt + 0.033293bb2t + 1.0543bYt + 0.0014314bY 2t
where again the asymmetries in the fiscal rules enable the tax rule to respond to the
consumption externality more eﬀectively. Here the non-linearity in the tax rule implies
that tax rates decrease more in response to falls in debt and output, than they rise in
response to increases. While the government spending rule does nothing to stabilise debt
(government spending continues to rise in response to an increase in debt), it moves in
line with output, with a slight tendency to rise more in a boom, in order to stabilise
the underlying government spending gap. The non-linearity enables this combination of
optimal rules to come closer to the welfare outcomes under the Ramsey policy. However,
with a welfare cost in terms of permanent consumption 0.39% higher than under Ramsey,
this set of optimal rules is slightly inferior to the optimal combination that features a
non-linear monetary policy rule.
For the two combinations of non-linear rules, we also assess their ability to mimic
the Ramsey policy in terms of impulse responses. Figures (13) and (14) plot the impulse
responses to a technology shock and a markup shock under the Ramsey optimal policy
(solid lines) and under the optimal rules: quadratic monetary rule with linear fiscal
rules (dash lines) and linear monetary rule with quadratic fiscal rules (dash-dot lines).
We notice that the optimal rules are better able to mimic the Ramsey policy when
considering a technology shock, whereas slightly larger diﬀerences relative to Ramsey
policy emerge following a markup shock. For both shocks and sets of rules, the rules,
while being fully determinate, are able to achieve a very slow adjustment of debt which
is close to the random walk in steady-state debt observed under the Ramsey policy.
At the same time, the strong response of the fiscal rules to output ensures that the
government spending gap is held fairly constant, while the tax rate moves to oﬀset the
consumption externality associated with deep habits.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explored optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian econ-
omy subject to deep habits in consumption, where the habits externality exists at the
level of individual goods. Employing second order approximation techniques we consider
various forms of optimal policy of increasing richness in the context of a significantly
distorted economy. We begin by considering the consumption response to government
spending shocks, when monetary policy is optimal. We show that earlier findings, that
deep habits can account for empirical results whereby public spending crowds in pri-
vate consumption, are not robust to relatively modest declines in the extent of habits
formation and allowing firms to price discriminate when supplying goods to the public
and private sectors. Furthermore, we find that government spending, despite being the
fiscal instrument that directly feeds into aggregate demand, contributes very little to the
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stabilisation of the economy following technology and mark-up shocks, when monetary
policy is conducted in an optimal manner.
When we consider the trade-oﬀs between business cycle stabilisation and fiscal sol-
vency, we find that it remains optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random
walk following shocks, although the transition to that steady-state is more gradual than
that observed in simpler models, due to the additional consumption externality faced
by the policy maker when consumers possess deep habits. In terms of the operation of
individual instruments, monetary policy largely ensures that the consumption gap is sta-
bilised in the face of technology shocks, while the income tax instrument serves to oﬀset
the consumption externality associated with habits and any shocks to the imperfectly
competitive firm’s desired markups.
Finally, we assessed the ability of simple linear and non-linear monetary and fiscal
policy rules to achieve the levels of welfare associated with the Ramsey policy. Relatively
simple interest rate and tax rate rules perform reasonably well, but are not able to
fully mimic the Ramsey policy. However, a combination of non-linearities in either the
monetary policy rule or the fiscal rules AND linear terms in output in the fiscal rules is
able to capture the welfare levels observed under the Ramsey policy.
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A Analytical Details (not for publication)
A.1 Households
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-
ket to minimize expenditures
min
{Ckit}i
Z 1
0
PCit C
k
itdi
s.t.
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit − θCit−1
´ η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
≥ Xkt
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η
Xkt + θCit−1.
where PCt can be expressed as an aggregate of the private goods i prices, PCt =³R 1
0
¡
PCit
¢1−η di´ 11−η . Averaging across all households gives the overall demand for pri-
vate final goods as,
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk =
µ
PCit
PCt
¶−η
Xt + θCit−1.
Utility Maximization The solution to the utility maximization problem is ob-
tained by solving the Lagrangian function:
L = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
h
u
³
Xkt , N
k
t ,X
G,k
t
´
− λkt
³
PCt X
k
t + Ptϑt +EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 − (1− τ t)WtNkt −Dkt −Φt
´i
(18)
In the budget constraint, we have re-expressed the total spending on the private con-
sumption basket,
R 1
0 P
C
it C
k
itdi, in terms of quantities that aﬀect the household’s utility,R 1
0 P
C
it C
k
itdi = P
C
t Xkt +PCt ϑt, where under deep habits ϑt is given as ϑt ≡ θ
R 1
0
³
PCit
PCt
´
Cit−1di.
Households take ϑt as given when maximising utility.
The first order conditions are then,¡
Xkt
¢
: uX(t) = λktPCt¡
Nkt
¢
: −uN (t) = uX(t) (1− τ t)WtPCt¡
Dkt
¢
: 1 = βEt
h
uX(t+1)
uX(t)
PCt
PCt+1
i
Rt
where Rt = 1Et[Qt,t+1] is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds.
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With utility given by u
¡
X,N,XG
¢
= X
1−σ
1−σ −χ
N1+υ
1+υ +χ
G (X
G)
1−σ
1−σ , the first derivatives
are
uX (·) = X−σ and uN (·) = −χNυ
A.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The cost minimization of intermediate goods producers involves the choice of labour
input Njit subject to the available production technology
min
Njit
WtNjit
s.t. AtNjit = Yjit
and yields a labour demand, Njit =
Yjit
At , and a nominal marginal cost which is the
same across all intermediate goods producing firms, MCt = WtAt . Profits are defined as:
Φjit ≡ PjitYjit −WtNjit = (Pjit −MCt)Yjit.
The profit maximization is subject to the Calvo-style of price setting behaviour
where, with fixed probability (1− α) each period, a firm can set its price and with
probability α the firm keeps the price from the previous period. When a firm can set
the price it does so in order to maximize the present discounted value of profits, subject
to the demand for its own goods. Profits are discounted by the stochastic discount
factor, adjusted for the probability of not being able to set prices in future periods:
max
P∗jit
Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦjit+s = Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+s
£¡
P ∗jit −MCt+s
¢
Yjit+s
¤
s.t.Yjit+s =
µ P ∗jit
Pmit+s
¶−ε
Yit+s
Qt,t+s = βs
µ
Xt+s
Xt
¶−σ PCt
PCt+s
Optimally, the relative price is set at
P ∗jit
PCt
=
µ
ξt
ξt − 1
¶ Et ∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
³
PCt+s
PCt
´−1 ¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
where mct = MCtPCt
is the real marginal cost, expressed in terms of private consumption
goods, and Yit = Y Cit + Y
G
it represents the total production of good i, including both
private and public goods. We allow the desired mark-up, ξtξt−1 , to be time varying
allowing for shocks to the mark-up implied by the elasticity of substitution between
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intermediate goods, where ln (ξt) = (1−ρm) ln(ε)+ρm ln(ξt−1)+(mt and (mt ˜iidN (0, σm).
The relative price can also be expressed as
P ∗jit
PCt
=
µ
ξt
ξt − 1
¶
K1t
K2t
where K1t and K2t have the following recursive representation:
K1t ≡ Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
µ
Pmit+s
PCt
¶ε
Yit+s
= X−σt mct
¡
μCt
¢−ε
Yit + αβEt
h
K1t+1
¡
πCt+1
¢εi
and
K2t ≡ Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
µ
Pt+s
Pt
¶−1µPmit+s
PCt
¶ε
Yit+s
= X−σt
¡
μCt
¢−ε
Yit + αβEt
h
K2t+1
¡
πCt+1
¢ε−1i
and μCt =
PCt
Pmt
represents the markup of private goods prices over the nominal marginal
cost of production.
B Equilibrium Conditions
B.1 Aggregation and Symmetry
Aggregate Output: The market clearing condition at the level of intermediate
goods is µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
Yit = AtNjit, ∀j, ∀i
which upon aggregation across the j firms becomes
Yit∆it = AtNit, ∀i
where Yit ≡ Y Cit + Y Git is the total production of good i, including sales to both the
private and the public sectors, and ∆it ≡
Z 1
0
³
Pjit
Pmit
´−ε
dj represents intermediate goods
price dispersion in sector i. With final goods producing sectors being symmetric, we can
drop the i subscript and write the aggregate production as,
Yt ≡ Y Ct + Y Gt =
At
∆t
Nt.
Aggregate Profits: Aggregate profits from intermediate goods producers are
given by
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Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Φjitdjdi =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(Pjit −MCt)Yjit djdi
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
µ
Pjit −
Wt
At
¶µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
(Y Cit + Y
G
it ) djdi
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
"
P 1−εjit
(Pmit )
−ε (Y
C
it + Y
G
it )−
Wt
At
(AtNjit)
#
djdi
=
Z 1
0
(Pmit )
ε (Y Cit + Y
G
it )
µZ 1
0
P 1−εjit dj
¶
di−Wt
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Njitdjdi
=
Z 1
0
Pmit (Y
C
it + Y
G
it )di−WtNt
while aggregate profits from final goods producers can be written asZ 1
0
ΦCitdi+
Z 1
0
ΦGitdi =
Z 1
0
(Pit − Pmit )Y Cit di+
Z 1
0
¡
PGit − Pmit
¢
Y Git di
=
Z 1
0
¡
PCit Y
C
it + P
G
it Y
G
it
¢
di−
Z 1
0
Pmit
¡
Y Cit + Y
G
it
¢
di
Then, the economy wide profits are
Φt =
Z 1
0
ΦCitdi+
Z 1
0
ΦGitdi+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Φjitdjdi
=
Z 1
0
¡
PCit Y
C
it + P
G
it Y
G
it
¢
di−
Z 1
0
Pmit
¡
Y Cit + Y
G
it
¢
di
+
Z 1
0
Pmit (Y
C
it + Y
G
it )di−WtNt
= PCt Y
C
t + P
G
t Y
G
t −WtNt
where we have used the assumption of symmetric final goods sectors to obtain the final
result.
Aggregate resource constraint: Combining the households’ budget constraint
with the government budget constraint and the above definition of profits gives the
aggregate resource constraint
PCt Ct + P
G
t Gt = P
C
t Y
C
t + P
G
t Y
G
t .
32
B.2 System of Equilibrium Conditions
Consumers:
Xt = Ct − θCt−1 (19)
XGt = Gt − θGGt−1 (20)
χNυt
X−σt
= (1− τ t)wt (21)
X−σt = βEt
"
X−σt+1
PCt
PCt+1
#
Rt (22)
Final goods firms:
When final goods firms can price discriminate between private and public purchasers
of their product their behaviour is described by,
Ct = ηωtXt (23)
ωt =
µ
1− 1
μCt
¶
+ θβEt
"µ
Xt+1
Xt
¶−σ
ωt+1
#
(24)
Gt = ηωGt X
G
t (25)
ωGt =
µ
1− 1
μGt
¶
+ θGβEt
"µ
Xt+1
Xt
¶−σ πGt+1
πCt+1
ωGt+1
#
(26)
While, when no such price discrimination is possible, then the mark-ups are the same
across sectors,
μGt = μ
C
t (27)
and equations (23) and (25) are combined as,
Ct +Gt = η(ωtXt + ωGt X
G
t ). (28)
Intermediate goods producers:
(Pmt )
1−ε = α
¡
Pmt−1
¢1−ε
+ (1− α)
¡
P ∗jt
¢1−ε (29)
P ∗jt
PCt
=
µ
ξt
ξt − 1
¶
K1t
K2t
(30)
where : K1t = X−σt mct
¡
μCt
¢−ε
(Y Ct + Y
G
t ) + αβEt
h
K1t+1
¡
πCt+1
¢εi
(31)
: K2t = X−σt
¡
μCt
¢−ε
(Y Ct + Y
G
t ) + αβEt
h
K2t+1
¡
πCt+1
¢ε−1i
(32)
33
mct =
wt
At
(33)
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + (
A
t (34)
ln ξt = (1− ρm) ln (ε) + ρm ln ξt−1 + (mt (35)
Aggregate production:
Yt = At
Nt
∆t
(36)
∆t = (1− α)
µ
P ∗t
Pmt
¶−ε
+ α (πmt )
ε∆t−1 (37)
Government budget constraint:
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt + PGt Gt −WtNtτ t (38)
And the following relationships linking the inflation measures,
πmt = π
C
t
μCt−1
μCt
= πGt
μGt−1
μGt
. (39)
B.3 The Deterministic Steady State
The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables and
nominal variables growing at a constant rate. The equilibrium conditions (19) - (28)
reduce to:
X = (1− θ)C (40)
XG =
¡
1− θG
¢
G (41)
χNυXσ = (1− τ)w (42)
1 = βR
¡
πC
¢−1
(43)
C = ηωX (44)
μC = [1− (1− θβ)ω]−1 (45)
G = ηωGXG (46)
μG =
£
1−
¡
1− θGβ
¢
ωG
¤−1
(47)
Without price discrimination, there is a common markup,
μG = μC (48)
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and the steady-state equations (44) and (46) combine in,
C +G = η(ωX + ωGXG) (49)
1 = α (πm)ε−1 + (1− α)
µ
P ∗
PC
μC
¶1−ε
(50)
P ∗
PC
=
ξ
ξ − 1
K1
K2
=
"
ε
ε− 1
1− αβ
¡
πC
¢ε−1
1− αβ (πC)ε
#
mc (51)
K1 =
uX mc
¡
μC
¢−ε Y
1− αβ (πC)ε (52)
K2 =
uX
¡
μC
¢−ε Y
1− αβ (πC)ε−1
(53)
mc =
w
A
(54)
ξ = ε (55)
A = 1 (56)
Y =
A
∆
N (57a)
∆ =
1− α
1− α (πm)ε
µ
P ∗
PC
μC
¶−ε
(58)
B
PC
≡ b =
¡
PG/PC
¢
G−wNτ
R−1 − (πC)−1
(59)
πm = πC = πG (60)
Table 1 contains the imposed calibration restrictions. We assume values for the
Frisch labour supply elasticity (1/υ), and the following parameters, β, σ, η, ε, α, θ, θG,
χ and χG. In describing optimal policy, we take the second order approximation around
the Ramsey steady-state, which is obtained by the solving the steady-state of the model
(as given by equations (40) - (60)), conditional on the optimal rate of inflation and levels
of taxation and government spending (for a given government debt to GDP ratio) which
are obtained by simultaneously solving the Ramsey first order conditions in (11).
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C The Social Planner’s Problem
In order to assess the trade-oﬀs facing the policy maker in a sticky-price economy subject
to tax, monopolistic competition and consumption externality distortions, it is helpful
to compute the eﬃcient allocation that would be chosen by a social planner. The so-
cial planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other ineﬃciencies and chooses real
allocations that maximize the representative consumer’s utility subject to the aggre-
gate production function and the law of motion for habit-adjusted private and public
consumption:
max
{Xt,Ct,Nt,XGt ,Gt}
E0
∞X
t=0
βtu
¡
X∗t ,N
∗
t ,X
G∗
t
¢
s.t. C∗t +G
∗
t = AtN
∗
t
X∗t = C
∗
t − θC∗t−1
XG∗t = G
∗
t − θGG∗t−1
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of
substitution between labour and habit-adjusted private consumption and the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution in habit-adjusted private consumption
χ (N∗t )
υ
(X∗t )
−σ = At
"
1− θβEt
µ
X∗t+1
X∗t
¶−σ#
.
In addition, the balance between private and public consumption is given by,
(X∗t )
−σ − θβEt
¡
X∗t+1
¢−σ
= χG[
¡
XG∗t
¢−σ − θGβEt ¡XG∗t+1¢−σ].
The deterministic steady state equivalent of these expressions are χ (N∗)υ (X∗)σ =
A (1− θβ) and
¡C∗
G∗
¢−σ
= χG
³
1−θGβ
1−θβ
´³
1−θG
1−θ
´−σ
, which upon further substitutions can
be written as,
χ (N∗)υ+σ [(1− θ)Ψ∗A]σ = A (1− θβ)
and µ
Ψ∗
1−Ψ∗
¶−σ
= χG
µ
1− θGβ
1− θβ
¶µ
1− θG
1− θ
¶−σ
,
where Ψ∗ is the optimal steady state share of private consumption, Ψ∗ ≡ C∗C∗+G∗ . In the
case of equal habits in the two types of consumption goods, the last expression simplifies
to
³
Ψ∗
1−Ψ∗
´−σ
= χG.
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D Log-linear Representation
Our log-linearised economy can be described as follows. Firstly, we have the IS curve in
terms of habit-adjusted consumption,
bXt = Et bXt+1 − 1σ bRt + 1σEtbπCt+1, (61)
and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) written in terms of producer price
inflation bπmt = βEtbπmt+1 + κ³cmct + bμCt ´ (62)
where κ ≡ (1−αβ)(1−α)α . The dynamic equations describing changes in the final goods
markups can be written as,
bωt = 1μCωbμCt + θβEtbωt+1 + θβσ ³ bXt −Et bXt+1´ (63)
bωGt = 1μGωG bμGt + θGβEt ³bωGt+1 + bπGt+1 − bπCt+1´+ θGβσ ³ bXt −Et bXt+1´ (64)
where the shadow values of producing another unit of a final good for the private and
public sectors are given by, bωt = bCt − bXt (65)
and bωGt = bGt − bXGt . (66)
We also have the following expressions defining habit-adjusted private and public
goods consumption bXt and bXGt , CPI inflation bπCt , public goods price inflation bπGt , and
the real marginal cost cmct:
bXt = 1
1− θ
³ bCt − θ bCt−1´ (67)
bXGt = 1
1− θG
³ bGt − θG bGt−1´ (68)
bπCt = bπmt + bμCt − bμCt−1 (69)
bπGt = bπmt + bμGt − bμGt−1 (70)
cmct = σ bXt + υ hΥ bCt + (1−Υ) bGti+ τ
1− τ bτ t − (1 + υ) bAt, (71)
where Υ is the steady state share of private consumption out of the total production,
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Υ ≡ CC+G . And finally, there is the government budget constraint,
bbt+1 = bRt +R ¡πC¢−1 ³bbt − bπCt ´+ Rb
∙
PG
PC
G
³ bGt + bμGt − bμCt ´−wNτ ³ bwt + bNt + bτ t´¸ .
(72)
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Parameter Value Description
r (1.04)1/4 Real interest rate
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Nw = (1/υ) 4.0 Frisch labour supply elasticity
η 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across final goods
ε 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods
α 0.75 Degree of price stickiness
θ 0.65 Degree of habits formation in private goods consumption
θG 0.65 Degree of habits formation in public goods consumption
χ 3.0 Relative weight on labour in the utility function
χG 0.111 Relative weight on utility from public goods consumption
B/GDP 0.6×4 Debt to GDP ratio
ρA 0.9 Persistence of technology shock
ρm 0.9625 Persistence of markup shock
ρG 0.9 Persistence of government spending shock
σA 0.009 Standard deviation of technology shocks
σm 0.0012 Standard deviation of markup shock
σG 0.014 Standard deviation of government spending shocks
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
αR απ γb κb
³
ζrules
ζRamsey
− 1
´
×100
Tax, active, common 1.0335 3.2685 0.1119 15.78
Tax, active, discriminating 1.0347 3.1713 0.11181 17.24
Tax, passive, common 0.15868 -11.396 -1.1438 37.62
Tax, passive, discriminating 0.17937 -10.827 -1.1528 39.07
G, active, common 1.1021 1.1936 -0.16841 40.53
G, active, discriminating 1.0125 1.1833 -0.16749 43.44
G, passive, common 0.17985 -9.1775 0.50357 39.07
G, passive, discriminating 0.20985 -9.0365 0.52252 39.07
Tax, G, active, common 1.0244 3.7333 0.133354 -0.049243 14.33
Tax, G, active, discriminating 1.0262 3.6057 0.13351 -0.04859 14.33
Tax, G, passive, common 0.13472 -8.3309 -1.2867 0.68082 21.61
Tax, G, passive, discriminating 0.16432 -8.3398 -1.196 0.65231 21.61
Table 2: The optimal parameterisation of the simple log-linear rules with no response
to output. Each row details the fiscal rule (by instrument type), the active/passive
nature of the monetary policy rule, and the type of pricing of final private and public
goods. The last column gives the percent increase in welfare costs relative to the Ramsey
optimal policy.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a +1% government spending shock with optimal mon-
etary policy: no habits (dots) and deep habits
¡
θ = θG = 0.65
¢
with common pricing
(solid line) and with discriminating pricing (dash lines). The inflation and interest rate
variables are expressed in annualized terms. Gap variables under no habits read oﬀ the
right y-axis.
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Figure 2: Consumption responses to a +1% government spending shock under optimal
monetary policy, with common pricing of private and public goods: θ = θG = 0.65 (solid
line), θ = 0.65 and θG = 0.2 (dashed line), θ = 0.85 and θG = 0 (dash-dot line).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock with optimal monetary and fiscal
policy, the case of lump-sum taxes: no habits (dots) and deep habits
¡
θ = θG = 0.65
¢
with common pricing (solid line) and with discriminating pricing (dash lines). The
inflation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms. Gap variables
under no habits read oﬀ the right y-axis.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative markup shock (+ 1% change in ξt) under
optimal monetary and fiscal policy, the case of lump-sum taxes: no habits (dots) and
deep habits
¡
θ = θG = 0.65
¢
with common pricing (solid line) and with discriminating
pricing (dash lines). The inflation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized
terms. Gap variables under no habits read oﬀ the right y-axis.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock under optimal monetary and
fiscal policy: no habits (dots) and deep habits (θ = θG = 0.65) with common pricing
(solid lines) and with discriminating pricing (dash lines). The inflation and interest rate
variables are expressed in annualized terms. Gap variables under no habits read oﬀ the
right y-axis.
44
0 2 4 6
−0.06−0.04
−0.020
0.02
Consumption
0 2 4 6
0
10
20
x 10−3 Government spending
0 2 4 6
−0.04
−0.02
0
Output
0 2 4 6
21.17
21.18
21.19
0 2 4 6
10.54
10.545
10.55
0 2 4 6
18.62
18.63
18.64
0 2 4 6
−0.04
−0.02
0
Producer price inflation
0 2 4 6
−0.04−0.02
00.02
0.040.06
0.08
CPI Inflation (πC)
0 2 4 6
0
0.05
0.1
Marginal cost
0 2 4 6
0
5
10
15
x 10−3 Markup C
0 2 4 6
0
5
10
15
x 10−3 Markup G
0 2 4 6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Real interest rate
years
0 2 4 6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Debt
years
0 2 4 6
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Tax rate
years
0 2 4 6
−28.25
−28.2
Consumption gap
0 2 4 6
−18.315
−18.31
−18.305
−18.3
Government spending gap
0 2 4 6
−25.68
−25.66
−25.64
Output gap
Figure 6: Impulse responses to a negative markup shock (+ 1% change in ξt) under
optimal monetary and fiscal policy: no habits (dots) and deep habits (θ = θG = 0.65)
with common pricing (solid lines) and with discriminating pricing (dash lines). The
inflation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms. Gap variables
under no habits read oﬀ the right y-axis.
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Figure 7: Determinacy Properties of the Government Spending Rule with Common
Pricing: determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
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Figure 8: Determinacy Properties of the Government Spending Rule with Price Dis-
crimination: determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark
grey).
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Figure 9: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Common Pricing: determinacy
(light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
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Figure 10: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Common Pricing under high
levels of habits formation: determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and insta-
bility (dark grey).
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Figure 11: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Price Discrimination: deter-
minacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
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Figure 12: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Price Discrimination under
high levels of habits formation: determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and
instability (dark grey).
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock under the Ramsey optimal
policy (solid lines) and the optimal simple rules: quadratic monetary policy with linear
fiscal policy (dash lines) and linear monetary policy with quadratic fiscal policy (dash-
dot lines), the benchmark calibration for deep habits with common pricing. The inflation
and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to negative markup shock (+1% change in ξt) under the
Ramsey optimal policy (solid lines) and the optimal simple rules: quadratic monetary
policy with linear fiscal policy (dash lines) and linear monetary policy with quadratic
fiscal policy (dash-dot lines), the benchmark calibration for deep habits with common
pricing. The inflation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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